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Our symposium is inspired by the observation that Kant‘s theory of 
judgment, as unfolded in the Critique of Pure Reason (the so-called first 
Critique), is juridical in nature. In the first Critique, Kant introduces the 
project of transcendental philosophy. There, Kant frames the idea of a 
―critique‖ of reason in juridical terms. At stake is the task of setting up a 
tribunal in front of which reason could assess the legitimacy of that 
tribunal‘s knowledge claims. Kant‘s suggestion is that reason—or better, 
the understanding—is a source of legislation, a power to make law and to 
give law to nature, which is itself considered as the sum total of all spatial 
and temporal phenomena. 
In the Critique of the Power of Judgment (the third Critique), Kant 
brings his critical project to conclusion. The juridical language is not 
abandoned. The third Critique addresses the question of judgment‘s 
legislative power. In the first Critique, judgment is not so much a power 
capable of giving law as it is a function for applying the principles that 
constitute the understanding. In the third Critique, by contrast, Kant 
advances the new claim that judgment, at least in a peculiar employment, 
which is the ―reflective‖ one, may be a faculty capable of legislating. The 
question of the third Critique regards the type of legislation that belongs to 
the power of judgment as well as the addressee of such legislation. What is 
this judgment that is capable of independent legislation? And what is the 
lawful domain over which such legislation extends? 
We have invited a distinguished group of Kantian scholars (and critics) 
to address these themes. 
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The first contribution in our collection is Angelica Nuzzo‘s Reflective 
Judgment, Determinative Judgment, and the Problem of Particularity.
1
 In 
her article, Professor Nuzzo explains how the third Critique advances the 
analysis of the first Critique. This development is required because in the 
perspective of judgment assumed by the third Critique, nature presents 
itself as ―the seemingly chaotic ‗labyrinth‘ of an infinite multiplicity of 
empirical forms for which only particular, empirical laws can be 
formulated.‖2 The thread that leads the subject out of the labyrinth is, of 
course, reflective judgment—judgment in which the subject ―finds‖ the 
universal under which a given particular is placed. This contrasts with 
judgment of the first Critique, where the universal is given and the 
particular is subsumed under the pre-existing universal. Particular stress is 
laid upon Kant‘s assertion that, while judgment is the faculty of 
subsuming under rules, there are no rules for subsumption, i.e., there is no 
rule that itself can guide judgment in its operations (the ―problem of 
stupidity‖). Because of this, the first Critique suggests that the faculty of 
judgment is a peculiar natural ―talent‖ that cannot be taught but only 
practiced. The third Critique instead suggests that the faculty of judgment 
is an a priori faculty that gives to itself its own a priori principle. 
In Kant on Teleological Thinking and Its Failure, Manfred Baum 
discusses Kant‘s notion of purposiveness in nature with regard to 
organisms.
3
 Organisms—plants and animals—seem to be purposive. The 
purpose of the seed is to grow into a tree, for example. But, Kant says, any 
purposiveness is attributed to them by human theory. As Professor Baum 
explains it, Kant could present only a subjective view of natural law, 
which he could motivate but not validate, making Kant a critic but not a 
theorist (in the model theory sense) of judgment. 
Tom Rockmore, in Kant on Art and Truth after Plato, explores the 
relation between Kantian aesthetics, as they unfold in the third Critique, 
and cognition.
4
 Professor Rockmore identifies the difficulty in Kantian 
aesthetics to be ―his overly optimistic view of interpretation.‖5 He sees 
Kant as believing in ―correct‖ interpretation, which pushes Kant toward an 
insufficiently critical ―platonic‖ position—a position on interpretation that 
undergoes growth and development (ironically) between the first and the 
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third Critiques. From Kant‘s attitude toward interpretation, Rockmore 
argues, there emerges cognitive claims for aesthetic judgment. This 
emergence poses for Kant the difficulty of admitting the subjective 
character of aesthetic judgment, on the one hand, ―while suggesting it 
yields knowledge in a way different from relying on concepts. . . . The 
arbiter of this relation is common sense, that is, the so-called free play of 
the cognitive powers.‖6 And the knowledge that aesthetic judgment 
produces is knowledge of the self, not knowledge of the beautiful object. 
In his essay, An Interest in the Impossible, Todd Kesselman explores 
Kant‘s notion of ―disinterested pleasure‖ in the beautiful.7 This pleasure is 
the harmony of two cognitive powers—the understanding and the 
imagination. The trick is to distinguish aesthetic pleasure from pleasure in 
the ―agreeable,‖ which would be nothing but heteronomy and therefore not 
a condition suitable to ground aesthetic judgment. Aesthetic pleasure must 
also be distinguished from moral pleasure, the side effect, (but not the 
determining ground), of an autonomous act. Kesselman reads Kant as 
denying the notion that the feeling entailed in encountering beauty is a 
mere signal of some underlying aesthetic reality. Instead, for Kant, the 
feeling of disinterested pleasure is the harmony itself, located in the 
subjective, rather than in the objective, realm. The harmony in question is 
the sustenance of a contradiction and therefore a ―kind of logical 
ambivalence . . . disinterested pleasure as interest without interest; 
purposiveness without purpose as lawfulness without law; and, subjective 
universality as unity without conceptual unity.‖8 
Rolf-Peter Horstmann‘s contribution is The Problem of Purposiveness 
and the Objective Validity of Judgments in Kant’s Theoretical 
Philosophy.
9
 At the outset, Professor Horstmann immediately renounces 
the title of the article as misleading, as Kant has three different concepts of 
purposiveness, depending on the context: 
The first relates to the possibility of empirical laws of nature and, 
somehow connected with it, to the possibility of empirical concepts. 
The second has to do with the theory of natural ends or of organized 
products of nature. . . . The third context has to do with aesthetics 
and concerns the explanation of the source of the validity of 
judgments of aesthetic appraisal. It is by no means clear whether in 
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all these contexts Kant relies on the very same conceptions of 
purposiveness . . . .
10
 
Nor, as we learn, is there one single problem raised by these diverse 
concepts of purposiveness. Professor Horstmann reviews the contours of 
purposiveness across all three of Kant‘s Critiques and claims that it was 
natural organisms that could not be digested by the first Critique, thereby 
necessitating the third. 
In Is a Determinant Judgment Really a Judgment?, Rodolphe Gasché 
explores Hannah Arendt‘s suggestion that the only real judgment is a 
reflective one.
11
 Determinant judgments, Arendt thought, are not 
judgments at all. In a reflective judgment, the subject constructs the 
universal under which a particular is subsumed. In a determinant 
judgment, the universal is pre-given and the perceived particular is 
―determined‖ as falling under the pre-given universal. Professor Gasché 
thinks that Arendt‘s suggestion ―paves the way for a political conception 
of judgment. This conception is needed in order to set what she calls the 
Erscheinungsraun constitutive of the political sphere radically apart from 
the political and public spaces characterized by violence . . . .‖12 
In The Regress Argument in Kant, Wittgenstein, and the Pittsburgh 
“Pragmatists”, Joseph Margolis addresses the denial by Kant (and 
Wittgenstein) that judgment can be reduced to ―following a rule.‖13 Any 
such attempt to found judgment in this way leads to an infinite regress. 
Professor Margolis analyzes different attitudes toward this regress—that 
of Kant (qualified as it is by transcendentalism), Wittgenstein (who was 
profoundly opposed to transcendentalism), and the approach articulated by 
the ―Pittsburgh School‖ (John McDowell, Peter Sellars, and Robert 
Brandom). The regress problem for Kant is ―no more than a minor 
nuisance,‖ whereas for Wittgenstein, the problem of regress has utterly 
disappeared for want of a transcendental position toward which the regress 
aims.
14
 In Professor Margolis‘s own view, ―the regress problem is little 
more than a benign form of skepticism: it cannot be solved . . . but it can 
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be borne lightly enough as the honest consequence of abandoning every 
form of foundationalism and cognitive privilege.‖15 
The title of Rudolf Makkreel‘s essay, Relating Kant’s Theory of 
Reflective Judgment to the Law eloquently describes his project.
16
 Of the 
three cognitive faculties—understanding, reason, and judgment—the 
understanding legislates the laws of nature. Theoretical reason takes on a 
judicial role by insisting upon a systematic order to these discovered laws. 
But this role must be compared with practical reason, which concerns 
itself with legislating the laws of freedom, not of nature. Judgment can 
also be legislative, but in a more restrictive sense. Whereas practical 
freedom concerns itself with universal moral laws, judgment is merely 
subjectively valid—heautonomous, not autonomous. The reflective 
judgment of aesthetic experience appeals to ―a lawfulness without a 
determinate law.‖17 Professor Makkreel interprets this statement as a 
contextualized sense of lawfulness that can also be applied to legal 
disputes. This concept is related to Kant‘s Metaphysics of Morals where 
Kant adjudicates such issues as property rights. 
Finally, in Effect Precedes Cause: Kant’s Theory of the Self-in-Itself, 
David Gray Carlson exploits the well-known dictum that one cannot know 
the thing in itself but only the appearance of it.
18
 Judgment of any object is 
to this extent heautonomous. When the object, however, is our own self, it 
is equally true that we can know only the appearance of ourselves, not the 
self-in-itself. The rules by which a subject lives are therefore legislated, 
though they are supposed to have been adjudicated. This means that the 
entire notion of rule following must be re-thought. It is not the case that 
the rules pre-exist the human act. This is an amphiboly, mistaking the 
appearance for the thing-in-itself. Rather, the effect of the rules (the 
human act) precedes the rules (which purport to cause the act). Law then 
becomes a project of self-justification not just to others but to our own 
selves. Because of this reversal of cause and effect, Professor Carlson 
names Kant a ―philosopher noir.‖19 
These papers were presented on October 25–26 at the Benjamin N. 
Cardozo School of Law in New York City. We are very grateful to the 
Jacob Burns Institute for Advanced Legal Studies and the Rhett Morgan 
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Rountree Fund for generously supporting this project. Rhett Rountree was 
a student at the Cardozo Law School with an exceptional interest in 
critical philosophy. Tragically, Rhett was killed in a fall, and in his honor 
a fund was endowed to support projects on critical philosophy. Rhett 
would have enjoyed participating in The Critique of Judgment. He will be 
forever missed. 
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